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1Abstract:
In this paper, we investigate the consequences of the rise in educational attainment
on the US generational accounts. We build on the 1995 accounts of Gokhale and al.
(1999) and disaggregate them per schooling level. We show that low skill newborns
are characterized by a negative generational account (-15.4% of their lifetime labor
income) whilst medium and high skill newborns have positive accounts (26.8% and
32.3% of their lifetime labor income). Compared to Gokhale et al., our baseline
forecast is more optimistic. Nevertheless, the rise in educational attainment is not
strong enough to restore the generational balance. The current …scal policy generates
a long-run de…cit. Balancing the budget requires increasing taxes (by about 1.2%) or
reducing transfers (by about 2.7%). These results are rather robust to growth and
discounting assumptions as well as to the treatment of education spending. They are
sensitive to assumptions about the schooling level of future generations.
JEL Classi…cations: E62-H6-J24
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21I n t r o d u c t i o n
Since the seminal works of Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotliko¤ (1991, 1994), and Kot-
liko¤ (1992), generational accounting has usually been perceived as a meaningful way
to evaluate the sustainability of …scal policy. It builds on an original treatment of
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint: at any date, the present value of
government purchases must be covered by the current net public wealth, the present
value of net taxes which will be paid by living generations over the rest of their life-
time and the present value of net taxes which will be paid by future generations over
their whole lifetime. The basic questions are: what burden must the government leave
on future generations to remain solvent? Is the resulting …scal treatment of future
generations’ members identical to that of the current newborns?
Economically, there is no reason for equalizing individual taxes and transfers.
Most …scal regimes involve high taxes for high income individuals and low taxes for
less productive workers. The same rationale can be applied to intergenerational re-
distribution. If one generation is economically more productive than another (for
example because its proportion of rich agents is higher), it seems justi…ed to make it
pay more taxes or receive less transfers. The generational accounting methodology
partially takes account of di¤erences in generational wealth by comparing generations
in terms of …scal pressure rather than on gross burden. Using balanced growth as-
sumptions, the classical methodology de…nes the generationally balanced policy as a
situation in which individual taxes and transfers increase at the same pace as labor
3productivity. However, existing generational accounting exercises rely on very simple
assumptions about the changes in labor productivity and/or lifetime labor income
across generations. Usually, these changes are related to a path of exogenous growth
rates that have no explicit link with the skill composition of the generations. Hence,
existing studies do not take account of an important source of heterogeneity within
and between generations, i.e. the rise in educational attainment of successive cohorts.
The purpose of this paper is to revisit the US accounts of Gokhale, Page and
Sturrock (1999)1 by introducing skill heterogeneity in the generational accounting
technique.2 GPS demonstrate that the US …scal policy is unsustainable and gener-
ationally imbalanced. They evaluate the …scal pressure imposed on a generation by
its lifetime net tax rate, i.e. the ratio of the present value (at birth) of net taxes one
generation has to pay to the government over its lifetime on the present value of its
lifetime labor income. They show that the lifetime net tax rate of future generations
amounts to 49.2%, to be compared with 28.6% for the current newborns. Such a
framework with a single representative agent within each generation fails to capture
the evolution of skills. In this paper, we demonstrate that it is crucial to introduce
skill heterogeneity for three main reasons:
1Henceforth GPS.
2It should be noted that heterogeneity has already been introduced in the generational accounting
framework. Most existing works distinguish males and females. This can be important for illustrative
purpose but has a smaller incidence on long-run evaluations since the sex composition of living and
future cohorts is extremely stable over time. Other studies such as Auerbach and Oreopoulos (2000)
on the US, Bonin and al. (1999) on Germany or Collado and al. (2001) on Spain distinguish
between natives and immigrants so as to evaluate the …scal e¤ect of immigration policies. This is
obviously pertinent in countries where migrants represent a large share of the population and/or
where selective immigration policies are explicit.
4² …rstly, it concerns the US population as a whole;
² secondly, the age-pro…le of taxes and transfers is highly dependent on educa-
tional attainment. We distinguish three large categories of education: less than
high school (<HS), high school (HS) and more than high school (>HS). Ac-
cording to our estimations, the average lifetime income of a low skill individual
amounts to $81,373 to be compared to $174,293 for a medium skill worker and
$311,540 for a high skill worker. On the contrary, the present value of public
bene…ts received by an agent over her whole lifetime amounts to $58,063 for the
low skilled, $30,974 for the medium skilled and $21,373 for the high skilled;
² …nally, the skill composition of the population drastically changes over time
and is likely to evolve in future years. In 1995, numbers taken from Lee and
Miller (1997) reveal that 64 percent of the population aged 80 had a diploma
lower than high school, against 24 percent for those graduated from high school
and 12 percent for those higher than high school. For the cohort aged 55, these
numbers were respectively 21 percent, 38 percent and 41 percent. For the cohort
aged 30 in 1995, we have 13 percent, 35 percent and 52 percent. Obviously,
skill heterogeneity is very strong among living generations. According to the
forecasts of Lee and Miller (1997), these proportions are likely to change in
the future, respectively converging towards 10.9 percent, 28.9 percent and 60.2
percent for future cohorts of adults with completed schooling. Such a forecast
can be seen as a medium variant, lying between the ”low projection” and the
5”high projection” of Cheeseman Day and Bauman (2000).
The rise in education attainment can be explained by several factors (public edu-
cation expenditures, rise in the skill premium...). For the next decades, the increase
in human capital per worker seems rather ineluctable as new educated cohorts will
progressively replace older less educated ones. These changes are likely to generate
…scal gains for the government. We argue that education is a key parameter for evalu-
ating the long-run sustainability of the current policy. By disregarding such changes,
the generational accounting technique induces two biases:
² extrapolating the living generation’s accounts on the basis of the current net tax
pro…le and common growth assumptions for taxes and bene…ts, the technique
is likely to lead to an underestimation of the net payments by living cohorts.
It makes little sense to assume that average net taxes of the generation aged
20 in 1995 can be projected on the basis on average net taxes paid by the
current older generations. Taking account of speci…c pro…les per schooling level
and changes in the skill composition of living cohorts allows to determine more
accurate path of net taxes for future years. This improves the evaluation of the
total burden left on future generations;
² evaluating the lifetime net tax rate of future generations must account for the
real lifetime labor income of these cohorts. These amounts obviously depend
on general assumption about total factor productivity but also on assumptions
about the skill composition of future generations. By disregarding the skill
6structure of future generations, the accounting technique is likely to underesti-
mate the lifetime labor income of these cohorts.
In the rest of this paper, we show that the rise in educational attainment strongly
modi…es the conclusion of GPS. To make comparisons relevant, our analysis is also
based on the 1995 …scal year and our adjustment calculations rely on the counter-
factual hypothesis that all changes begin in 1995. Generally speaking, our paper
provides a sensitivity analysis to GPS benchmark assumptions. Our conclusions are
more optimistic and raise numerous issues about educational policies and social mo-
bility (how to increase the incentives to educate? Would the cost of increasing the
average schooling level exceed the …scal gains?), about the political sustainability of
current taxes and transfers (if the government de…cit decreases, will there be a …scal
pressure to reduce taxes or to increase transfers) and about the structure of the labor
market (can these …scal gains resist to the increasing supply of skills?). Nevertheless,
the only purpose of our contribution is to compute the impact of educational changes
on the government budget constraint all other things being constant, i.e. taking
the economic environment as given. Consequently, our results must exclusively be
appreciated in terms of …scal sustainability.
Section 2 discusses data issues and the calibration of net tax pro…les per age
and education level. It is shown that educational attainment a¤ects both taxes and
bene…ts. However, di¤erences in tax pro…les are stronger. Generational accounts
per skill are then computed in section 3. As in GPS, our basic assumptions about
7the growth rates of per capita taxes and bene…ts build on the o¢cial projections
of the Congressional Budget O¢ce (CBO).3 The term ”…scal policy” then re‡ects
both the current age pro…le of net taxes (per age and educational level) and o¢cial
growth rates for per capita amounts. Our results indicate that low skill newborns are
characterized by a negative generational account (-15.4 percent of their lifetime labor
income). Lifetime net tax rates for medium and high skill newborns are positive and
amount to 26.8 percent and 32.3 percent.
Taking account of the rise in educational attainment has a strong impact on the
results. Compared to GPS, it is shown that the total burden left on future generations
is reduced by about 30.7 percent in our baseline scenario. Consequently, our results
are more optimistic. Nevertheless, we show that the drastic rise in educational attain-
ment do not restore the …scal sustainability. Balancing the long-run de…cit requires
increasing taxes (by about 1.2 percent) or reducing transfers (by about 2.7 percent).
This contrasts with the study of GPS which reveals that restoring the generational
balance in 1995 requires cutting all transfers by 17.5 percent or increasing all taxes
by 8.2 percent. Section 4 provides a similar exercise by considering public education
expenditures as transfers rather than a part of government purchases. Similar results
are obtained but the government de…cit becomes slightly higher than in the baseline
scenario. Restoring the balance allows to increase taxes by 1.4 percent or to cut
transfers by 2.4 percent. A sensitivity analysis is presented in section 5. Section 6
3See CBO (1997a, 1997b).
8concludes. An appendix provides our mathematical tools for generational accounting
with heterogenous skills and an alternative simulation closer to the CBO aggregate
projections. However, we show that the latter scenario is rather inconsistent with
the assumption about labor productivity growth. We conclude that changes in edu-
cational attainment is a key parameter for analyzing the sustainability of the …scal
policy.
2 Data issues
Estimating the age pro…les of taxes and bene…ts for a reference year is the building
block for any longitudinal calculation. In this paper, we use GPS estimates of the
contemporary pro…les for men and women in 1995. We aggregate men and women
pro…les using sex composition data per age. These pro…les concern six types of tax
(Labor Income taxes, FICA taxes, Excise taxes, Capital Income taxes, Seignorage
taxes and Property taxes), seven types of bene…t (OASDI, Medicare, Medicaid, Un-
employment Insurance, General Welfare, AFDC and Food Stamps) and three items of
government purchases (Education expenditures, Federal government purchases and
State government purchases). These pro…les are scaled so as to match aggregated
observations (i.e. the observed shares in GDP). The continuous lines (in black) on
…g. 1.1 and …g. 1.2 represent the total taxes and total bene…ts paid or received (ex-
cluding education spending) by the representative agent of each living cohort in 1995.
The continuous line (in black) on …g. 1.3 gives the di¤erence between taxes paid and
9bene…ts received. It appears that net taxes are positive for individuals aged 15 to 70
(net contributors) and negative for individuals above age 70 (net bene…ciaries).
These representative pro…les represent the weighted average of net taxes paid
by all the US residents in 1995. These age-speci…c amounts are thus depending
on the average characteristics of living cohorts, i.e. on their sex composition, their
average skill levels, their nativity... In this paper, we disaggregate these amounts per
educational level. This requires disaggregating each tax or bene…t item of the GPS
dataset. Three educational levels are distinguished: individual with a less than high
school diploma (<HS), those with a high school diploma (HS) and those with a more
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Note: Present values in 1995 dollars
11Two statistical sources are used :
² regarding labor income taxes, capital income taxes and OASDI bene…ts, we use
data extracted from the PSID (Panel Study on Income Dynamics4)o ft h eU S
population aged 20 and more in 1993. For these individuals, the education level
is reported. After elimination of illogical and non responses, we compute the
representative pro…les for these items on the basis of 17,943 observations. For
those aged less than 20, we consider that the pro…les are identical. PSID data
are also used to compute the lifetime labor income per schooling level;
² regarding other items of taxes and bene…ts (including public education expen-
ditures), we use the pro…les estimated by Lee and Miller (1997) per educational
level, per cohort and, for immigrants only, by date of entry. These pro…les are
based on 1994 and 1995 data from the CPS (Current Population Surveys). For
individuals aged 20 and more, the education level is reported. For children (aged
0 to 19), education is forecast on the basis of parent’s level and ethnicity. We
do not distinguish between immigrants and natives.
All these disaggregated pro…les are then calibrated so as to be consistent with
the GPS averages. We use data on the skill composition of the US living cohorts in
1995 from Lee and Miller (1997). For the population aged 20 and more, these data
correspond to the education levels measured in the US General Social Survey (GSS).
4These data are available from the website: http://www.isr.umich.edu/src/psid.
12For the population aged 0 to 19 (those reaching age 20 between 1996 and 2015), Lee
and Miller (1997) forecast educational attainment on the basis of parents’ level of
education and ethnicity. Then, we consider that the skill structure of future cohorts
(aged 20 after 2015) is stationary. Compared to existing studies, our scenario can
be seen as a medium variant. It lies between the ”low projection” and the ”high
projection” provided in Cheeseman Day and Bauman (2000).
The …rst column of table 1 gives the cohort shares per educational level in 1995.
It appears that 52.0 percent of the population aged 30 has a diploma higher than high
school, against 35.0 percent for those graduated from high school and 13.0 percent
for those lower than high school. At 60 years old, these numbers were respectively
36.6 percent, 36.9 percent and 26.5 percent. For the newborns, they should be 60.2
percent, 28.9 percent and 10.9 percent.
The rest of table 1 thus provides age pro…les per educational level fully consistent
with the GPS estimates. We only report the main categories of taxes and transfers.
Fig. 1.1 to 1.3 give the disaggregation per schooling level of total taxes, total bene…ts
and net taxes for each living age group. The impact of educational attainment is
mainly perceptible for taxes: at 60 years old, the taxes paid by a high skill individual
are six times as large as the amount paid by a low skill individual. However, smaller
di¤erences are also appearing in bene…t pro…les. In terms of net taxes, low skill agents
are obviously the main bene…ciaries of the …scal policy whilst medium and high skill
agents are the contributors. At age 60, the ratio of net taxes between a high skilled
13and a medium skilled is about 3.5. Hence, it makes no doubt that changes in the
educational structure strongly a¤ect the sustainability of the current …scal policy.













Less than High School
0 10.9% 0 0 0 549 7 446 0
20 16.1% 336 -5 880 1545 13 669 1450
30 13.0% 1187 158 2086 1935 86 1863 2462
40 11.2% 1474 339 2185 2334 345 2406 2250
50 16.3% 1418 273 2288 2403 446 3109 1434
60 26.5% 995 490 1508 3172 1133 2995 863
70 33.1% 153 692 211 3363 7320 5473 864
100 64.0% 28 0 30 1472 7090 6787 450
High School
0 28.9% 0 0 0 549 7 342 0
20 32.3% 1080 37 1365 2023 22 340 675
30 35.0% 2655 262 3432 2749 67 786 1086
40 32.0% 3068 990 3761 4404 210 840 860
50 35.2% 2963 1167 4036 5210 315 874 457
60 36.9% 2015 1496 2472 5985 812 978 282
70 36.5% 269 1851 301 6712 8870 5175 155
100 24.0% 79 0 52 1918 8897 6666 140
More than High School
0 60.2% 0 0 0 549 7 247 0
20 51.6% 1245 336 1332 2846 12 150 272
30 52.0% 4439 1016 5001 5443 83 317 444
40 56.8% 5356 2839 5955 9936 135 337 385
50 48.6% 6019 4999 6184 15246 246 445 257
60 36.6% 4211 7506 4434 20711 784 575 180
70 30.4% 894 8690 952 22878 10012 5072 183
100 12.0% 59 0 134 2973 11769 6593 116
Weighted average (a)
0 -   000 5 4 9 7 2 9 6 0
20  -  1045 184 1270 2371 15 295 591
30  -  3392 640 4073 4044 78 682 931
40  -  4191 1969 4832 7318 183 729 746
50  -  4196 2882 4795 9627 303 1029 518
60  -  2549 3430 2935 10631 887 1365 399
70  -  421 3547 469 10518 8704 5242 398
100   -  44 0 48 1759 8085 6735 336
Note:  (a) Weighted averages corresponding to GPS profiles
Source: GPS; PSID; Lee and Miller (1997); Authors' calculations
143 Revisiting 1995 generational accounts
Let us now introduce the disaggregated net tax pro…les in the generational account-
ing framework. The starting point of generational accounting is the government’s
intertemporal budget constraint. At the base year 1995, the sum of the public net
wealth and the present value of prospective aggregate net payments by living and fu-
ture generations must equalize the present value of prospective public purchases. The
public net wealth is the only observable item of this constraint : it amounts to -$2.1
trillion in 1995. Regarding generational accounts of living and future generations, we
follow GPS and proceed as following.
Using assumptions about the time path of government purchases and individual
amounts of tax and transfer for living generations enables to derive the present value
of government purchases and payments by living generations. It is also possible to
compute the hypothetical generational accounts of future cohorts under the same
…scal policy than for living cohorts. Combining these amounts into the government
intertemporal budget constraint, we compute the …scal adjustment required to bal-
ance the budget. This adjustment a¤ects taxes and/or transfers from 1995 onwards.
Hence, it impacts on the situation of both living and future generations. Depending
on the type of adjustment we opt for, we compute the ”adjusted” generational ac-
counts of living and future generations that are budgetary sustainable. Finally, these
”adjusted” payments made by the newborns and individuals not yet born can be
compared on a lifetime basis. The technical appendix 8.1 describes our methodology.
15The present value of government purchases (PVG). T h eP V Gi st h ed i s -
counted sum of government purchases (State and Federal purchases, including educa-
tional expenditures) from 1995 under the assumed …scal policy. Our baseline scenario
builds on GPS study. Through 2070, we then use the path of government purchases
simulated by the Congressional Budget O¢ce. Beyond 2070, government purchases
are supposed to grow by 1.2 percent per year. The baseline discount rate is 6 percent.
The present value of payments by living generations (PVL). The PVL
sums up generational accounts of all the members of living generations. By gener-
ational account, we mean the present value of net taxes that a member of a group
will pay over the rest of her life under the assumed …scal policy. Evaluating the ac-
counts of living generations then requires a long-run prospective calculations relying
on some crucial assumptions about the demographic size of each living generation, its
educational structure, the evolution of per capita taxes and bene…ts and the economic
environment. Here is a description of the main assumptions:
² our baseline scenario relies on the intermediate population projection of the
Social Security Administration (SSA), extended by GPS projections beyond
2070 (assuming that fertility, mortality and net immigration rates remain at
their 2070 level. This scenario implies a sharp deterioration of the old-age
dependency ratio (i.e. the ratio of people aged 65+ to people aged 15-64). The
ratio amounts to 19% in 2000 and is expected to reach more than 33% in 2050
and about 40% in 2100;
16² the growth rates of per capita taxes and bene…ts are those used in GPS study,
themselves building on the reference projection of the Congressional Budget
O¢ce through 2070. A growth path is calculated for each item of tax and
bene…t. We equivalently apply these growth rates to per capita amounts paid
(or received) by the members of each educational category. For a given path of
growth rates, our …scal projections are a¤ected by the changes in educational
structure and in demographic size (while GPS/CBO aggregates are only a¤ected
by the demography). An alternative scenario would be to calibrate the growth
rates so as to match the CBO aggregate projections per item. Nevertheless,
appendix 8.2 shows that our baseline scenario is more consistent with the as-
sumption about labor productivity growth than aggregate budgetary forecasts5.
Consequently, our projections do not correspond to those of the Congressional
Budget O¢ce;
² the net tax pro…les are assumed to be stable over time. It could be argued that
the rise in educational attainment will impact on the return to skill and reduce
the gap between skilled and unskilled workers even if it did not happen in the
past decades (between 1970 and 2000, the return to skills has increased despite
a remarkable rise in educational attainment). It could also be argued that the
5The CBO projection does not take account of the rise in educational level of the population. In
appendix 8.2, we compare our baseline scenario (based on CBO growth rates for per capita taxes
and transfers) with an alternative scenario based on CBO aggregated projections. This requires
calibrating the alternative growth rates of per capita taxes and bene…ts so as to match GPS/CBO
aggregate amounts. Our calculations show that the resulting growth rates are hardly consistent with
the 1.2 percent growth rate of labor productivity.
17rise in school attendance will change the average cost of education per student.
However, endogenizing the tax pro…les is beyond the scope of our accounting
study;
² the educational attainment of living generations in 1995 is depicted in table
1. For each living generation, the educational structure is assumed to be con-
stant over time. Given the absence of life table per educational attainment,
we disregard the e¤ect of heterogeneity in mortality (life expectancy is usually
higher for the high skilled) as well as the timing of immigration ‡ows (for young
generations, future immigration ‡ows are likely to reduce the share of skilled
workers over time);
² as for the PVG, the discount rate is set to 6 percent. The growth rate of indi-
vidual taxes and transfers beyond 2070 is set to 1.2 percent.
Generational accounts of living generations are given in table 2. It clearly appears
that the generational account of a low skill newborn is negative. On their whole
lifetime, unskilled agents are expected to receive more transfers than paying taxes to
the government. On the opposite, generational accounts of medium and high skill
individuals are positive. More particularly, the average generational account of a high
skill newborn is twice as large as the account of a medium skill newborn. It is also
worth noticing that generational accounts of low skill agents are always negative while
it is only the case after age 53 for the medium skilled and after age 64 for the high
skilled. To compare everyone on the same basis, GPS suggest to calculate the lifetime
18net tax rates, i.e. the ratio of generational account on the present value of lifetime
labor income. This exercise can be done for each educational group. As it will appear
in table 3, the lifetime net tax rates of newborns amount to -15.4 percent for the low
skilled, 26.8 percent for the medium skilled and 32.3 percent for the high skilled. The
average lifetime net tax rate then amounts to 32.1% (against 28.6% in GPS study).
Given the changes in the skill composition of these living cohorts, our average
generational accounts per cohort are not identical to GPS amounts. This appears
on the bottom part of table 1 and on …g. 2. The di¤erences are small for old-age
cohorts rather large for young cohorts. Extrapolating the future taxes and transfers
of newborns on the sole basis of the contemporaneous pro…le, the classical method
underevaluates the newborns’ average account by 10.7 percent.
19Table 2. Generational accounts of living generations
Baseline scenario (a)
Present value of 
taxes




Less than High School
0 45552 -58063 -12511  - 
20 91345 -114177 -22832  - 
30 93963 -120576 -26612  - 
40 83769 -123509 -39740  - 
50 66764 -127465 -60701  - 
60 41724 -143701 -101977  - 
70 23742 -140866 -117124  - 
100 1529 -14328 -12798  - 
High School
0 77682 -30974 46708  - 
20 160019 -58543 101476  - 
30 165160 -63977 101183  - 
40 151898 -76054 75844  - 
50 118288 -98194 20094  - 
60 73049 -139618 -66568  - 
70 41400 -149275 -107875  - 
100 2049 -15704 -13655  - 
More than High School
0 121860 -21373 100487  - 
20 274928 -40601 234327  - 
30 309355 -50327 259028  - 
40 311983 -67363 244620  - 
50 276591 -98489 178102  - 
60 194531 -149011 45520  - 
70 114091 -170570 -56479  - 
100 3167 -18478 -15311  - 
Weighted average
0 100790 -28140 72650 64910
20 208241 -58235 150006 149355
30 230878 -64238 166640 159492
40 235294 -76415 158880 135353
50 186775 -103095 83680 65347
60 109224 -144138 -34913 -39160
70 57654 -152966 -95312 -95738
100 1851 -15156 -13305 -13305
Note: (a) Present value in 1995 dollars
Source: Authors' calculations
20Fig. 2. Average generational account per cohort
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Burden left on future generations. The total burden left on future generations
is directly obtained as the residual of the government’s budget constraint. It amounts
to $6,509 billions instead of $9,398 in the GPS methodology. This is due to the
fact that the usual methodology underevaluates the total payments made by living
generations.
Balancing generational accounts. Examining the sustainability of the …scal
policy requires computing the present value of payments by future generations under
the current policy (based on the assumptions of Congressional Budget O¢ce about
the growth rate of per capita taxes and transfers). For this purpose, we use our fore-
casts about the educational structure of future generations. Despite the remarkable
rise in educational attainment, maintaining the current policy for future generations
generates a present value of payments lower than the total burden left by living
generations. In words, the current …scal policy is still unsustainable.
Restoring the balance thus requires cutting transfers or increasing taxes. In the
21classical method of generational accounting, such an adjustment is implemented by
multiplying net taxes of future generations by a constant adjustment factor. In our
case with heterogenous agents, such a rule would give rise to inconsistent results since
generational accounts are of opposite signs. For example, multiplying generational
accounts by 1.1 would induce more …scal e¤ort for individuals with a positive account
at birth, but a lower e¤ort for those with a negative account. Moreover, it seems quite
unrealistic to adjust the accounts of future generations only. As argued by Haveman
(1994), both living and future generations are likely to be concerned by …scal changes.
For these reasons, we use an adjustment method which concerns all the members of
all the generations. In a …rst step, we compute the present value of payments by
future generations under the current …scal policy. Comparing this amount to the
residual burden given by the budget constraint, we obtain the gap to be …nanced
by (in case of de…cit) or to be allocated to (in case of surplus) all living and future
generations. In a second step, we compute the proportional adjustment in all taxes
(or in all transfers) required to balance the budget. Finally, given the ”adjusted”
…scal policy, we derive the new generational accounts and lifetime net tax rate.6 Our
adjustment calculations rely on the counterfactual assumption that all changes begin
in 1995.
Table 3 summarizes our results. Restoring the balance through tax adjustment
induces a rise in all taxes by 1.16 percent. The lifetime net tax rates then become
6Our strategy slightly di¤ers from GPS who compute the changes in taxes and/or bene…ts so as
to equalize the lifetime net tax rates of current and future generations.
22-14.7 percent, 27.3 percent and 32.7 percent. Restoring the balance through transfer
adjustment induces a cut in all transfers by 2.68 percent. The lifetime net tax rates
then become -13.5 percent, 27.3 percent and 32.4 percent. These results contrast
with GPS who predict that generational balance requires increasing all taxes by 8.2
percent or reducing all bene…ts by 17.5 percent. This demonstrates the huge potential
impact of the rise in educational attainment in evaluating the long-run sustainability
of …scal policies.
Table 3. Generational imbalance and lifetime net tax rates
Baseline scenario (a)
Present value of 
taxes




Lifetime Net Tax 
Rate (b)
Newborns' generational account and lifetime tax rate without policy adjustment
<HS 45552 -58063 -12511 -15.4%
HS 77682 -30974 46708 26.8%
>HS 121860 -21373 100487 32.3%
Restoring the balance through tax adjustment (+1.16%)
<HS 46080 -58063 -11983 -14.7%
HS 78582 -30974 47608 27.3%
>HS 123272 -21373 101899 32.7%
Restoring the balance through transfer adjustment (-2.68%)
<HS 45552 -56504 -10952 -13.5%
HS 77682 -30142 47540 27.3%
>HS 121860 -20800 101061 32.4%
Note: (a) Present value in 1995 dollars
(b) Lifetime net tax rate = generational account / discounted lifetime labor income
Source: Authors' calculations
234 Distributing education expenditures per age and
schooling level
In the line of GPS, let us now consider another scenario in which public education
expenditures (about one …fth of government purchases) are treated as individual
transfers. In our baseline scenario, education spending are evolving at the same pace
as the rest of government purchases such as defense or administration. In this new
scenario (labelled as ”Education Bene…t”), they evolve with the demography (the
number of individual in age of schooling), the educational composition of successive
cohorts (determining the length and the cost of schooling) and with common growth
assumption taken from GPS study. This scenario is then extremely important for our
study. Table 4 gives the generational accounts of living generations.
24Table 4. Generational accounts of living generations
Education benefit scenario (a)
Present value of 
taxes




Less than High School
0 45552 -101081 -55529  - 
20 91345 -117060 -25714  - 
30 93963 -122286 -28322  - 
40 83769 -124261 -40492  - 
50 66764 -127653 -60888  - 
60 41724 -143799 -102075  - 
70 23742 -140893 -117151  - 
100 1529 -14330 -12801  - 
High School
0 77682 -73246 4436  - 
20 160019 -60986 99033  - 
30 165160 -65687 99473  - 
40 151898 -76805 75092  - 
50 118288 -98381 19906  - 
60 73049 -139715 -66666  - 
70 41400 -149303 -107902  - 
100 2049 -15707 -13658  - 
More than High School
0 121860 -80451 41409  - 
20 274928 -56460 218468  - 
30 309355 -52037 257318  - 
40 311983 -68115 243868  - 
50 276591 -98676 177915  - 
60 194531 -149108 45423  - 
70 114091 -170598 -56507  - 
100 3167 -18480 -15313  - 
Weighted average
0 100790 -80613 20177 13153
20 208241 -67668 140573 139868
30 230878 -65948 164930 157782
40 235294 -77166 158128 134602
50 186775 -103282 83493 65159
60 109224 -144235 -35011 -39257
70 57654 -152993 -95339 -95765
100 1851 -15159 -13308 -13308
Note: (a) Present value in 1995 dollars
Source: Authors' calculations
Treating education spending as bene…ts obviously reduces newborns’ accounts for
each schooling level. The di¤erences with the baseline scenario amounts to $43,000 for
the low skilled, $42,300 for the medium skilled and $59,000 for the high skilled. These
25numbers measure the cost of education (in present value at birth). The changes are
important for individual aged 25 and less. They are minor for older generations for
which mandatory education belongs to the past. As it will appear on table 5, lifetime
net tax rates of newborns become -68.2 percent, 2.5 percent and 13.3 percent.
Once again, our average generational accounts per cohort are not identical to
GPS amounts. This clearly appears on …g. 3. The di¤erences are small for old-age
cohorts but they are larger for young cohorts. Extrapolating the future taxes and
transfers of newborns on the basis of the contemporary pro…le, the classical method
underevaluates the newborns’ average account by about 35 percent.
Fig. 3. Average generational account per cohort
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In this scenario, the total burden left on future generations amounts to $2,063
billions (instead of $4,881 in the GPS methodology). The current …scal policy is
still unsustainable and generates a budgetary long run de…cit. The de…cit is higher
than in the baseline case. Education spending are increasing more quickly than in the
baseline scenario due to the changes in the educational structure of the population.
26As depicted in table 5, restoring the balance through tax adjustment induces a rise in
all taxes by about 1.39 percent (against 5.0 percent in GPS framework). The lifetime
net tax rates then become -67.5 percent, 3.2 percent and 13.8 percent. Restoring
the balance through transfer adjustment induces a cut in all transfers by about 2.38
percent (against 13.0 percent in GPS framework). The lifetime net tax rates become
-65.3 percent, 3.5 percent and 13.9 percent.
Table 5. Generational imbalance and lifetime net tax rates
Education benefit scenario (a)
Present value of 
taxes




Lifetime Net Tax 
Rate (b)
Newborns' generational account and lifetime tax rate without policy adjustment
<HS 45552 -101081 -55529 -68.2%
HS 77682 -73246 4436 2.5%
>HS 121860 -80451 41409 13.3%
Restoring the balance through tax adjustment (+1.39%)
<HS 46187 -101081 -54894 -67.5%
HS 78766 -73246 5519 3.2%
>HS 123560 -80451 43109 13.8%
Restoring the balance through transfer adjustment (-2.38%)
<HS 45552 -98674 -53122 -65.3%
HS 77682 -71502 6180 3.5%
>HS 121860 -78535 43326 13.9%
Note: (a) Present value in 1995 dollars
(b) Lifetime net tax rate = generational account / discounted lifetime labor income
Source: Authors' calculations
5 Sensitivity analysis
Generational accounts depend on uncertain assumptions about demographic changes,
labor productivity growth rate, budgetary policy, interest rate and the future trends of
educational attainment. In this section, we analyze the sensitivity of our calculations
to alternative assumptions about growth and interest rates and about the educational
27attainment of future cohorts.
As in GPS, our baseline scenario assumes a 6 percent discount rate and that
productivity increases by 1.2 percent a year. This discount rate is roughly equal to
the historical real rate of return on equity. A 1.2 percent productivity growth rate
is a reasonable value given the past trend of labor productivity. Table 6 reports
alternative projections when the interest rate amounts to 3 percent (a value closer
to the real return on government bonds) or 9 percent (a value closer to the return
on private capital) and when the labor productivity growth rate varies between 0.7
percent and 1.7 percent a year. These alternative scenarios are the same as those
used in GPS analysis. The results must be compared to the baseline scenario in
which education spending are included in government purchases.
Obviously, alternative assumptions about the rate of productivity growth have a
minor e¤ect on the results. Remember that the pure indexation of individual taxes
and bene…ts on productivity growth is implemented after the year 2070. Before that
date, the evolution of taxes and bene…ts relies on the CBO forecasts and is not
much a¤ected by the growth hypothesis. On the contrary, alternative assumptions
about the interest rate modify the calculations. The lifetime net tax rate of low skill
individuals is particularly a¤ected when the interest rate changes. However, interest
rates and growth rates do not modify the main result: in all cases, the current …scal
policy is unsustainable. The policy adjustments to restore the generational balance
are robust (especially when the interest rate increases). The tax variation ranges from
281.0 to 4.7 percent in the two extreme scenarios. Transfer cuts range from 2.5 to 9.0
percent.
Table 6. Generational accounts and budgetary adjustments
Sensitivity to discount and growth rate assumptions
Newborns' generational account and lifetime tax rate without policy adjustment
Generational accounts Lifetime net tax rate
<HS g=0.007 g=0.012 g=0.017 g=0.007 g=0.012 g=0.017
i=0.03 -88290 -89701 -91204 -34.4% -35.0% -35.5%
i=0.06 -12391 -12511 -12638 -15.2% -15.4% -15.5%
i=0.09 -1124 -1136 -1148 -3.8% -3.8% -3.9%
HS g=0.007 g=0.012 g=0.017 g=0.007 g=0.012 g=0.017
i=0.03 88015 86535 84943 17.3% 17.0% 16.7%
i=0.06 46840 46708 46565 26.9% 26.8% 26.7%
i=0.09 22485 22470 22453 33.0% 33.0% 33.0%
>HS g=0.007 g=0.012 g=0.017 g=0.007 g=0.012 g=0.017
i=0.03 278223 276415 274400 27.8% 27.7% 27.5%
i=0.06 100677 100487 100270 32.3% 32.3% 32.2%
i=0.09 40481 40453 40419 35.8% 35.8% 35.8%
Restoring the generational balance through…
Tax change (in % of the current policy) Transfer change (in % of the current policy)
g=0.007 g=0.012 g=0.017 g=0.007 g=0.012 g=0.017
i=0.03 3.5% 4.0% 4.7% -7.0% -7.8% -9.0%
i=0.06 1.1% 1.2% 1.2% -2.5% -2.7% -2.9%
i=0.09 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% -2.6% -2.7% -2.8%
Source: Authors' calculations
Finally, let us examine the sensitivity of our results to the assumptions about
educational attainment of young and future generations. Our baseline scenario is
based on Lee and Miller (1997). For the population aged 0 to 19 (those reaching age
20 between 1996 and 2015), Lee and Miller (1997) forecast educational attainment
on the basis of parents’ level of education and ethnicity. After 2015, we assume that
the skill structure of future cohorts (aged 20 after 2015) is stationary. Regarding
individuals who just completed schooling, the proportions of low, medium and high
skilled workers in 1995 are respectively 13, 35 and 52 percent. In 2005, Lee and
Miller forecast a slight decrease in educational attainment until 2005 (the proportions
become 16, 32 and 52 percent). Then the shares converge towards 10.9, 28.9 and 60.2
29percent. These long-run proportion are reached in 2015. Compared to the study of
Cheeseman Day and Bauman (2000), the baseline scenario must be considered as a
reasonable medium variant.
Two alternative forecasts can be simulated. Building on the ”high projection”
of Cheeseman Day and Bauman (2000), the high variant is based on very optimistic
assumptions about future educational attainment. In the long-run, it assumes that
the proportions of high skilled workers aged 30 will reach 70.2 percent in 2030 (against
5.2 percent for low skilled workers and 24.6 for the medium skilled). Our ”low variant”
relies on the most pessimistic annual forecast from Lee and Miller. We keep the 2005
educational structure (16 percent for the low skilled, 32 and 52 percent for the medium
and high skilled) as constant after that year.
Table 7 gives the results. Clearly, newborns’ generational accounts and lifetime
net tax rates are quite stable. In terms of generational balance, the low variant
has a deep impact on the long run de…cit. Taxes must be increased by 5.69 percent
(instead of 1.16 in the baseline scenario) or transfers must be reduced by 12.52 per-
cent (instead of 2.68 in the baseline). Alternatively, the optimistic variant built on
Cheeseman Day and Bauman generates a long run budgetary surplus. A continued
rise in educational attainment would make the …scal policy sustainable: taxes could
be reduced by 1.3 percent or transfers could be increased by 3.13 percent. Of course,
reaching the high variant’s educational attainment would probably require a strong
expansionary education policy. If the marginal cost of education is increasing, the
30discounted cost of such a policy could exceed the discounted …scal gains. In some
sense, the baseline scenario seems more realistic since it relies on the current State
intervention. Nevertheless, our sensitivity analysis demonstrates the crucial role of
education policies in the debate on aging and public …nance.
Table 7. Generational accounts and budgetary adjustments
Sensitivity to the long-run educational structure
Newborns' generational account and lifetime tax rate without policy adjustment
Generational accounts Lifetime net tax rate
Low Baseline High Low Baseline High
<HS -12261 -12511 -13820 -15.1% -15.4% -17.0%
HS 46940 46708 45728 26.9% 26.8% 26.2%
>HS 100653 100487 99651 32.3% 32.3% 32.0%
Restoring the generational balance through…
Tax change (in % of the current policy) Transfer change (in % of the current policy)
Low Baseline High Low Baseline High
5.69% 1.16% -1.30% -12.52% -2.68% 3.13%
Newborns' lifetime tax rate after policy adjustment through…
Tax change Transfer change
Low Baseline High Low Baseline High
<HS -11.9% -14.7% -17.7% -6.2% -13.5% -19.3%
HS 29.5% 27.3% 25.7% 29.1% 27.3% 25.7%
>HS 34.5% 32.7% 31.5% 33.2% 32.4% 31.8%
Source: Authors' calculations
6C o n c l u s i o n
It is usually argued that expected demographic changes threaten the sustainability
of …scal policies. In most industrialized countries, social policies involve considerable
transfers from young cohorts to old cohorts. If the number of bene…ciaries increases,
the …nancial viability of the system is obviously questioned. Generational accounting
is perceived as a meaningful way to evaluate the sustainability of …scal policy. Up-
dated calculations made for the US reveal a large generational imbalance which can
be restored by increasing taxes or cutting transfers.
31To the best of our knowledge, these studies do not take account of a remarkable
change in the characteristics of people, the rise in educational attainment. This
change is budgetary important since it strongly modi…es the …scal means and needs of
successive generations. In this paper, we disaggregate tax and bene…t age-pro…les per
schooling level. This reveals strong di¤erences in net taxes among living generations.
Aggregating these net taxes on a whole lifetime basis, we show that the low skill
newborns’ account is negative (-15.4 percent of their lifetime labor income) whilst
medium and high skill newborns have positive accounts (26.8 percent and 32.3 percent
of their lifetime labor income). Taking account of the (past and expected) changes in
the educational structure avoids two sources of bias: the overestimation of the total
burden left on future generations and the underestimation of the …scal capacity of
these future generations.
Our results are more optimistic than those of existing studies. Our baseline sce-
nario indicates that the current …scal policy (de…ned by the current level of taxes
and transfers as well as by the growth assumptions of per capita taxes and bene-
…ts provided by the CBO) generates a long-run de…cit. However, the de…cit is much
lower than the GPS predictions. Restoring the generational balance requires cut-
ting transfers by 2.7 percent or increasing taxes taxes by 1.2 percent. These results
are quite robust to our assumptions about labor productivity growth, interest rate.
Treating education expenditures as transfers gives similar results. However, results
are sensitive to assumptions about the educational structure of future cohorts.
32Is that a su¢cient reason to move from a highly pessimistic position to a highly
optimistic one? This strongly depends on the (at least relative) stability of net tax
pro…les per schooling level. We should keep in mind that generational accounting is a
pure mechanical projection tool which keeps these relative di¤erences as constant over
time. It does not take account of the interdependencies between the demography, the
changes in the educational structure and the economy. If young generations are more
and more educated, the average cost of education per student could be a¤ected. If
unskilled and skilled labor are imperfect substitutes on the labor market, an increase
in the supply of skills could give rise to a drop in the skill premium and a possible
rise in …scal needs of the highly skilled. We could then observe a shift of skilled
agents’ net taxes closer to unskilled agents’ ones. It is worth noticing that it did not
happen in the past. In spite of a huge rise in educational attainment, returns to skills
have also increased substantially over the last four decades. Moreover, recent theories
of endogenous technical biases suggest that a positive relationship between the skill
premium and the average level of schooling is likely to emerge in the long-run. As
argued by Acemoglu (2002), a rise in the education level of the labor force stimulates
investments in skill-consuming technical processes and increases the long run demand
for skilled workers. Compared to our predictions, this would reinforce the role of
education on public …nance. It is however di¢cult to forecast the evolution of the
skill premium without a long-run model of the US economy. Integrating generational
accounts and …scal policies in such a framework is obviously a promising issue that
33we leave for further research.
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358 Appendix
8.1 Methodology with heterogenous agents
The starting point of the generational accounting technique is the government’s in-
tertemporal budget constraint. At the base year t, the sum of the public net wealth
and the present value of prospective aggregate net payments by living and future
generations must equalize the present value of prospective public purchases:
PVL t + PVFt + NWt = PVG t (1)
where PVL t measures the present value of net tax payments by living generations
over the rest of their life, PVF t is the present value of net tax payments by future
generations, PVGt stands for the present value of prospective government purchases
of goods and services and NWt is the net public wealth.
The net wealth at time t is observed. Two of the remaining terms are projected
using contemporaneous observations and o¢cial projections, PVG t and PVL t.T h e
fourth term, PVFt, can thus be calculated as the residual burden bequeathed to
future generations.






(1 + i)s¡t (2)
36where Gs is the amount of public purchases projected at time s ¸ t; i denotes
the interest rate. In practice, the path of Gs can be partly projected on the basis
of budgetary forecasts (i.e. between t and t¤) and partly projected using balanced
growth assumptions (between t¤ and 1). In the long-run, it is assumed that Gs grows
at the same rate as the growth rate of the total factor productivity, g.
The present value of net tax payments by living generations can be obtained by
summing the present value of net taxes these generations will pay to the government
over the rest of their life, i.e. summing the generational accounts of living cohorts.
We distinguish three educational levels (L = low level, M = mean level and H =
high level) and suppose that each individual can live a maximum of D years. The





















j;t stands for the size of type-X population (X = L;M;H) of age j at time t,
nX
j;t measure the generational account of these agents.
Generational accounts sum up the amount of net tax to be paid by each type of













(1 + i)k¡j j =0 ;:::;D (4)
where µ
X
k;t+k¡j is the amount of net tax payment by an agent of type X and age k at
37time t + k ¡ j.
In practice, pX
k;t+k¡j can be projected using demographic forecasts (including mor-
tality and net immigration ‡ows), data on schooling levels per age, and estimates for
the educational attainment of the young living generations after completion of their
education. The net taxes µ
X
k;t+k¡j can be partly extrapolated on the basis of short-run
forecasts (taking account of o¢cial budgetary projections and potential …scal reforms
between t and t¤) and partly extrapolated using balanced growth assumptions (be-




It should be noted that the generational accounts of the newborns, measuring the
present value of net taxes they expect to pay over their whole lifetime, need not to be
of the same sign. It can be negative for low skill individuals and positive for the high
skilled. These generational accounts can be expressed as percentage of the discounted
lifetime labor income, denoted by W X
0;t for a newborn agent of type X. In the line of









The basic issue of the generational accounting is the …nancial sustainability of
public policies. Given the generational account of the newborns at time t (nX
0;t),
will it be possible to be so generous with future generations? The present value
of net tax payment by future generations, PVFt, does not itself give an answer to
38this question. To go further, one needs to transform this aggregate burden into an
individual amount, the average account of future cohorts.
One way to proceed is to compute the hypothetical generational accounts of future



















(1 + i)s¡t (6)
where PVF¤
t measures the present value of net payments by future generations under
the assumption that the current …scal policy is sustainable.
This hypothetical value can then be compared to the residual value PVF t com-
puted from (1):
² if PVF¤
t = PVF t, the policy is sustainable and there is no need of …scal ad-
justment;
² if PVF¤
t >P V F t, the government budget is in surplus so bene…ts could be
increased for the same levels of taxes;
² if PVF¤
t <P VF t, the current policy is not sustainable or not generationally
balanced: it implies that either future generations must pay di¤erent net taxes
than current generations or current policy must be adjusted to restore sustain-
ability.
In case of unsustainability, the basic methodology suggest to adjust taxes and/or
39transfers at some date. In this paper, we use an adjustment method which concerns
a l lt h em e m b e r so fa l lt h eg e n e r a t i o n s .I fag a ph a st ob e… n a n c e d( i nc a s eo fd e … c i t )
or allocated (in case of surplus), we compute the proportional adjustment in all taxes
(or in all transfers) required to balance the budget7.







B;j;s. A time-invariant adjustment factor can be ap-
p l i e dt oe a c ho ft h e s ec o m p o n e n t s( ´T for taxes and ´B f o rb e n e … t s )s oa st or e s t o r e
sustainability. We then apply these proportional changes to both living generations
(over the rest of their lifetime) and future generations so as to balance the budget












































There is a continuum of pairs (´T;´ B) restoring the balance. Two speci…c pairs
are usually considered, one with ´T =0if the balance is achieved through transfer
cuts and one with ´B =0if the balance is achieved through tax increases. For each
scenario, the lifetime tax rate of future generations can be computed and compared
to that of the current newborns.
7It should be noted that, in the line of GPS, the balance can also be restored through changes
in government purchases
408.2 An alternative scenario: trusting CBO projections
The CBO projection does not take account of the rise in educational level of the pop-
ulation. Let us examine an alternative scenario where the growth rates of per capita
taxes and transfers are calibrated so as to match the CBO aggregated projections
(for each item). In that case, the average generational accounts of living generations
are almost identical to those reported in GPS study. Nevertheless, our methodology
allows to disaggregate living generations’ account by schooling level. In table A1, it
is shown that the lifetime net tax rate amounts to -26.0 percent for the low skilled,
22.7 percent for the medium skilled and 28.7 percent for the high skilled. Applying
CBO projections up to 2070 also determines the prospective contribution of future
generations. It is only after 2070 that the our calculations become highly sensitive
to the educational structure of the population. Our generational balanced policy is
thus very close to that suggested in GPS study. Restoring the balance requires in-
creasing all taxes by 8.16 percent or reducing all transfers by 17.54 percent (this is
not signi…cantly di¤erent from GPS).
Is this scenario based on CBO aggregated projections more consistent than our
baseline scenario? Our answer depends on the growth rates of per capita taxes and
bene…ts. Table A.2 compares the average growth rates per item for the period 2010-
2050. Our calculations indicate that the baseline growth rates are more consistent
with the 1.2 percent growth rate of labor productivity. This is especially the case for
individual taxes. In our baseline scenario, the growth rate of labor income tax, capital
41income tax and FICA are fully consistent with the growth rate of labor productivity.
In the other scenario, this is obviously not the case. The gap between labor produc-
tivity growth and the growth rates of per capita bene…t is also smaller in our baseline
scenario.
Table A1. Generational imbalance and lifetime net tax rates
Baseline scenario (a)
Present value of 
taxes




Lifetime Net Tax 
Rate (b)
Newborns' generational account and lifetime tax rate without policy adjustment
<HS 42699 -63826 -21127 -26.0%
HS 72377 -32804 39573 22.7%
>HS 111295 -21888 89406 28.7%
Restoring the balance through tax adjustment (+8.16%)
<HS 46182 -63826 -17644 -21.7%
HS 78281 -32804 45477 26.1%
>HS 120373 -21888 98484 31.6%
Restoring the balance through transfer adjustment (-17.54%)
<HS 42699 -52631 -9932 -12.2%
HS 72377 -27050 45327 26.0%
>HS 111295 -18049 93246 29.9%
Note: (a) Present value in 1995 dollars
(b) Lifetime net tax rate = generational account / discounted lifetime labor income
Source: Authors' calculations
Table A2. Average yearly growth rate of per capita taxes and benefits (2010-2050)
"Baseline scenario" vs "Trusting CBO"
Benefits OASDI Medicare Medicaid UI Gen. Welfare AFDC Food Stamps
Trusting CBO 0.4% 1.6% 2.3% 1.2% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7%
Baseline scenario 0.6% 1.5% 1.9% 1.1% 0.9% 1.2% 1.1%
Taxes Labor Inc. FICA Excise Capital Inc. Property
Trusting CBO 0.9% 0.9% 0.7% 0.1% 0.5%
Baseline scenario 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 0.9% 0.8%
Source: GPS (1999) and authors' calculations
42